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IN THE UTAH: COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, . 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
BILLY J. VIGIL, 
Defendant-Appe11 ant 
Case No, b JO "' J i i ii« i 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Jurisd i ct 1 on «\ I '" n i1 ' I A | -)UM 1 i i :•• established 
,j /3-2a- - .,a) (£) , rtah Code Annotated, 1953,, as amended, 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal 
Commitment from the Fifth District Court 
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 mt. n f' fered into 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES OR RULES 
The statute which is believed to be. determinative in 
this matter is 76-10-501(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended. This statute is reproduced in total as the addendum to 
this brief. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of a conviction after a jury trial 
wherein the Defendant was convicted of Possession of a Dangerous 
Weapon by a Restricted Person. 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This matter was first set for trial on September 25, 
1989, but was halted after the Defendant moved for a mistrial 
bases on an answer given by Agent J. Lowe Barton from the Utah 
State Department of Corrections Adult Probation and Parole 
Department. After the mistrial was granted, the trial was reset 
for December 11, 1989. The Defendant objected to the resetting 
of the matter for trial and moved to dismiss on the grounds of 
double jeopardy, but the motion was denied. The case was retried 
on December 11, 1989. The Defendant was convicted at that trial. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
Following the Defendant's conviction at trial, the 
Defendant was sentenced to serve zero to five years at the Utah 
State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 1, 1989, agents of the Utah State Department 
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of Corrections Adult Probation and Parole Department observed the 
Defendant, Billy Vigil, in the possession of certain color 
television sets at the Cedar Post pawn shop in Cedar 
City. (T.19-20) Because Mr. Vigil was a parolee under the 
supervision of the Department of Corrections, the officers 
completed their previous business and returned to the pawn shop 
to ask what Mr. Vigil was doing with these television sets. The 
person at the pawn shop reported that Mr. Vigil was buying the 
television sets for his employer at the American Siesta Motel, in 
Cedar City, but also reported to the agents that Mr. Vigil 
appeared to be under the influence of alcohol. (T.21) The agents 
then went to Mr. Vigil's room at the American Siesta Motel and 
there found him to be under the influence of alcohol. (T.21) 
They arrested Mr. Vigil and then searched his possessions finding 
several knives in a bag inside the closet of the motel 
room. (T.22-23) Also in the bag were a martial arts "throwing 
star" and a pair of "num-chucks", which are also martial arts 
equipment. (T.23) A search of Mr. Vigil's truck also yielded 
another knife iri a scabbard. (T.24) There is no evidence that 
Mr. Vigil ever handled or used any of these items in any 
fashion—either aggressively or non-aggressively. The matter was 
first scheduled for trial on September 25, 1989. The Defendant 
was present at that time as were all of the witnesses needed for 
trial, and a jury was impaneled and the matter proceeded before 
the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen. After the State had rested 
and the Defendant began his case in chief, Agent J. Lowe Barton 
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of the Utah State Department of Adult Probation and Parole was 
called to testify. During examination by the undersigned counsel 
for the Defendant, the questioning went as follows: 
By Mr. Shumate 
Q. Did you ever discuss with him the size or number or 
character of knives that he could or could not own as a parolee? 
A. We never, as I recall, got into exact specifics on 
knife sizes. In, I don't recall the date, but the, last time 
that he was convicted of a felony it was for possession of a 
straight razor. 
At that time, the undersigned moved for Judge 
Christensen to declare a mistrial which the Judge 
did. (Transcript of trial hearing, September 25, 1989.) On 
October 10, 1989, a Motion was prepared and mailed to the Clerk 
of the Court to dismiss the case against Mr. Vigil by virtue of 
the improper termination of the earlier trial. That Motion was 
denied by Judge J. Philip Eves on October 17, 1989. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court improperly denied the Motion to Dismiss and 
reset the matter for trial when the first trial had to be 
terminated through no fault of the Defendant but by reason of the 
State's witness volunteering inappropriate evidence before the 
trial jury. This Defendant-Appellant argues to the court that 
when items are claimed by the State of Utah to be dangerous 
weapons and the items inherently have both deadly and non-deadly 
potentials the State must show some evidence of their use as 
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dangerous weapons in order to convict a person of the possession 
of a deadly weapon. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHILE, UNDER PRESENT UTAH LAW, THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS 
WITHIN HIS DISCRETION TO DENY THE MOTION TO DISMISS, THE PRESENT 
STATE OF UTAH LAW IMPOSES AN UNREASONABLE BURDEN UPON CRIMINAL 
DEFENDANTS AND DENIES THEM DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN, THROUGH NO 
FAULT OF THEIR OWN, THE STATE'S AGENTS VOLUNTEER EVIDENCE 
TAINTING A JURY TRIAL. 
This Defendant-Appellant understands that under the 
present state of the law in the State of Utah in order for a 
mistrial to be dispositive of the case it must usually be 
declared over the objection of the Defendant. If the Defendant 
moves for the mistrial and the motion is granted, the law deems 
that the Defendant has waived any claim of double jeopardy.(State 
v. Ambrose, 598 P. 2d 354 {Utah, 1979}) In the present 
circumstances, this Defendant was forced to request a mistrial 
because of the misconduct of the State's probation agent 
volunteering additional information about the Defendant's prior 
criminal record. Both the State and the Defendant had agreed to 
stipulate to the fact that the Defendant was on parole in order 
to keep the specifics of the Defendant's criminal record from 
improperly coming before the trial jury. The present state of 
the law requires the Defendant to show that the State or the 
Court acted in bad faith in placing the tainted information 
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before the jury before he can be deemed to have not waived his 
rights under the double jeopardy clause.(State v. Jones, 645 
P.2d 656{Utah, 1982}) The standard of proof for such a claim is 
so high that in practical terms no criminal defendant will ever 
be able to establish that the State of Utah did in bad faith act 
to place evidence before the jury that would cause a mistrial. 
This Defendant asserts to this court that such a standard is 
unreasonable and that he should be given the opportunity to argue 
for a mistrial in these circumstances without waiving his right 
to be free from double jeopardy. It should also be noted that 
the testimony which provoked the Defendant's mistrial motion came 
form the State's probation agent, not from the prosecutor or the 
Court. The present state of the law places the any Defendant in 
the position of showing bad faith by the State's Prosecutor or 
intentionally waiving his constitutional right to be free from 
double jeopardy. This provision of the law places a burden of 
producing evidence upon the Defendant in a criminal case which is 
nearly impossible to show. By a subtle insertion of damaging, 
and otherwise inadmissible evidence, the State's probation agent 
forced this Defendant to request a mistrial, abandon a jury that 
he had chosen and approved, and also (absent the difficult 
showing of bad faith) waive his right to be free of double 
jeopardy. 
POINT II 
NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED REGARDING THE MANNER OF USE 
OF THE ITEMS CLAIMED BY THE STATE OF UTAH TO BE DANGEROUS 
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WEAPONS. 
This Defendant would argue to the court that the 
knives, throwing star, and num-chucks taken from the Defendant's 
possession can only be proven to be dangerous weapons for the 
purpose of supporting his conviction when those weapons are 
proven to have been used by the Defendant in a manner meeting the 
statutory definition for a dangerous weapon.( 76-1-601 [5] and 
76-10-501 [2][a], Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended) In the 
present case the State proved that these items were possessed by 
Mr. Vigil by showing that they were located in his motel room and 
also in his truck. However, the State did not establish that the 
items were ever used by Mr. Vigil in any fashion. The State 
offered expert testimony with regard to the throwing star and the 
num-chucks to indicate that they were martial-arts weapons, but 
this testimony was evenly balanced by the fact that there was 
also testimony showing that these items are also used by 
individuals simply practicing the martial arts and not using the 
items as dangerous weapons. 
In both of the above-cited statutes, defining the term 
"dangerous weapon", the legislature has relied heavily on the 
concept of "use or intended use" in establishing whether or not 
an item is a "dangerous weapon". In 76-1-601 (5), Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, an item ( or a facsimile thereof) is 
a dangerous weapon if it is capable of causing death or serious 
bodily injury and the actor's use or apparent intended use of the 
item causes a victim to believe the item is likely to cause death 
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or serious bodily injury, or the actor represents to the victim 
that the actor has control of such an item. In 76-10-501 (2)(a), 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, an item is a dangerous 
weapon if in the manner of its use or intended use it is capable 
of causing death or serious bodily injury. In this definition 
the legislatures went on to say that if the item is not commonly 
known as a dangerous weapon its character, the character of any 
wound produced, or the manner in which it was used, are 
determinative. In both statutes the key to an item's existence 
as a dangerous weapon lies in its use. In this case there was no 
evidence of any use or intended use of the knives, throwing star, 
or num-chucks. Without such evidence, the proof is insufficient 
to support a conviction. This writer has searched the Utah cases 
on this issue and it appears to be a case of first impression. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Defendant's 
conviction should be reversed with instructions to the trial 
court on remand to dismiss the Information on the basis of double 
jeopardy or because there was insufficient evidence to sustain 
the conviction at trial on the issue of the use of the items in 
question. 
DATED this
 V^J) day of May, 1990. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Mr. Paul Van 
Dam, Utah Attorney General, 2 36 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114, this J day of May, 1990, first class 
postage fully prepaid. 
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76-10-501. Uniform law — Definitions. 
(1) (a) The individual right to keep and bear arms 
being a constitutionally protected right, the Leg-
islature finds the need to provide uniform laws 
throughout the state. 
(b) The provisions of this part are uniformly 
applicable throughout this state and in all its 
political subdivisions and municipalities. No lo-
cal authority may enact or enforce any rale in 
conflict with the provisions of this part. 
(2) For the purpose of this part: 
(a) "Dangerous weapon" means any item that 
in the manner of its use or intended use is capa-
ble of causing death or serious bodily injury. In 
construing whether an item, object, or thing not 
commonly known as a dangerous weapon is a 
dangerous weapon, the character of the instru-
ment, object, or thing; the character of the wound 
produced, if any; and the manner in which the 
instrument, object, or thing was used are deter-
minative. 
(b) "Firearms" means pistols, revolvers, 
sawed-ofT shotguns, or sawed-off rifles, or any de-
vice that could be used as a weapon from which is 
expelled a projectile by any force. 
(c) "Sawed-ofT shotgun" means a shotgun hav-
ing a barrel or barrels of fewer than 18 inches in 
length, or in the case of a rifle, having a barrel or 
barrels of fewer than 16 inches in length, or any 
weapon made from a rifle or shotgun by alter-
ation, modification, or otherwise, if the weapon 
as modified has an overall length of fewer than 
26 inches. 
(d) "Prohibited area" means any place where it 
is unlawful to discharge a weapon. 
(e) "Crime of violence" means murder, volun-
tary manslaughter, rape, mayhem, kidnapping, 
robbery, burglary, housebreaking, extortion, or 
blackmail accompanied by threats of violence, as-
sault with a dangerous weapon, assault with in-
tent to commit any offense punishable by impris-
onment for more than one year, arson punishable 
by imprisonment for more than one year, or an 
attempt to commit any of these offenses. 
(f) "Bureau" means the Utah State Bureau of 
Criminal Identification. i9M 
ADDENDUM 
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C O P Y 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BILLY J. VIGIL, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 1327 Criminal 
ABSTRACT FROM TRANSCRIPT 
OF TRIAL HEARING 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that the above-entitled 
matter came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable 
Cullen Y. Christensen, Judge Pro Tern of the above-entitled 
Court, sitting with a jury, on the 25th day of September, 
1989, at the Iron County Courthouse, Parowan, Utah; 
That there appeared as couns'el represen-
ting Plaintiff State of Utah, KYLE D. LATIMER, ESQ., Deputy 
Iron County Attorney, and as counsel representing defendant, 
JAMES L. SHUMATE, ESQ. 
WHEREFORE, the following proceedings 
were heard upon the afternoon of said trial date, commencing 
at a point where the witness J. Lowe Barton was recalled to 
the stand to testify as a defense witness: 
MR. SHUMATE: I'll recall Agent Barton, 
EDWARD V. QUIST, CSR 1 
briefly, your Honor. 
J. LOWE BARTON, having been called as 
a witness, an4 having previously been first duly sworn and 
having previously testified, was recalled as a witness and 
testified as a defense witness, as follows: 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SHUMATE: 
Q Agent Barton, in your capacity as the supervising 
agent for Mr. Vigil, did you sit down and go through with 
him and explain to him the activities that he could and 
could not engage in as a parolee? 
A Yes. 
Q And that was reduced to a written agreement. Is 
that correct? 
A Yes, it was. 
Q Did you ever discuss with him the size or number 
or character of knives that he could or could not own as a 
parolee? 
A We never, as I recall, got into exact specifics 
on knives sizes. In, I don't recall the date, but the, the 
last time that he was convicted of a felony it was for pos-
session of a straight razor. 
MR. SHUMATE: Excuse me, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Just a minute. 
MR. SHUMATE: May we excuse the jury and 
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allow me to make a motion? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
Then, ladies and gentlemen, if you'll step down 
please. Don't discuss the case among yourselves, permit 
anyone to discuss it with you, or enhance your information 
concerning the matter. 
(WHEREUPON, the Jury exited the courtroom at 2:20 
o'clock p.m.) 
MR. SHUMATE: Your Honor, at this time, 
because of the response of Mr. Barton, I would first move 
to strike the response as non-responsive. Second, I am 
forced to ask for a mistrial because of the allusions by Mr, 
Barton to the prior felony conviction of Mr. Vigil for 
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, 
which is one of Mr. Vigil's convictions out of April of 
1986. That allusion by Mr. Barton I'm afraid has unfortun-
ately tainted this jury and we cannot go forward. Mr. 
Latimer and I had reached an agreement to avoid that kind 
of prejudice in the case, and now Mr. Barton has brought it 
in. 
THE COURT: Mr. Latimer. 
MR. LATIMER: Your Honor, the state's 
response; first of all, non-responsive: The question was, 
MDid you ever discuss no possession of knives being in 
violation of his parole?" And Agent Barton was responding 
-* 
to that how he was going to get into the conviction, how he 
explained to them, you know, ,fyoufve done it before, don't 
do it again.M But regarding his statement as to conviction, 
I don't think it got out. All I heard was "possession of" 
and Mr. Shumate cut him off. I don't think there has been 
any undue influence. I'm not submitting that even if it 
got to the jury that that would be reason for a mistrial, 
because I think it's a relevent thing anyway although it may 
not have come out at the right time. Primarily, I don't 
think Mr. Barton specified what the conviction was. He 
stated --
THE COURT: Well, let's have it read 
back; Mr. Quist. 
(WHEREUPON, the reporter read back the last 
question and answer.) 
MR. LATIMER: May I further address 
that then? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. LATIMER: It would be our position 
it was brought out that he was convicted of possession of a 
weapon. It wasn't brought out in a proper timing as far as 
being against the defendant directly or as part of the public 
record, but I don't think that's -- still think that's 
admissible evidence. I don't think that's sufficient to 
taint the jury. The big issue we had here today was his 
L 
intent tor having that knife. And 1 think if it's going to 
be in, if it's into the jury, then that goes to intent, it 
goes to motive, it goes to motive operandi, it goes to 
those various elements that makes something like that rele-
vant. 
We'd submit it on that. 
THE COURT: Any further, Mr. Shumate? 
MR. SHUMATE: Your Honor, after listening 
to the reporter's notes, it's very clear that my question 
was much more narrow than the response that we got from Mr. 
Barton.. 
I'll submit it. 
THE COURT: Under Rule 609; purpose of 
attacking the credibility of a witness: Evidence that the 
witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if 
elicited from the witness or established by public record 
during cross examination, but only if the crime (1) were 
punishable by death or imprisonment. So that, on one. 
Now, there's another section of the statute and 
that's --
MR. LATIMER: I was referring to 404(b). 
THE COURT: 404. 
MR. LATIMER: Regarding what you just 
read, 608, that's 609. The state was not asking the question 
So I don't think we've violated that rule. 
5 
THE COURT: Well, the Court would carry 
on. That Rule 404(b) says: Evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of 
a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. 
It may however be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity or knowledge of a particular action. 
Commentary states: Subdivision (b) deals with a 
specialized but important application of the general 
supplied -- circumstantial use of character evidence. Con-
sistently with that rule evidence of other crimes, wrongs 
or acts is not admissible to prove character or as a basis 
for suggesting the inference that conduct on a particular 
occasion was in conformity with it. 
Now in this case it's obvious the jury knows that 
Mr. Vigil has been convicted of something; that these were 
wrongs which amounts to a felony; that he was on parole or 
was at the time that this incident occurred. Seems to me 
that the statement however is more than just a statement of 
fact that he's been convicted or has been convicted of some-
thing. It is of a specific type of charge that he, the 
statement was made, similar charge, possession of a dangerous 
weapon by a restricted person, possession of a straight 
razor. Not dissimilar from what we've got here. And if you 
go back to Rule 609; that is, immediately: The credibility 
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of the witness can be attacked by showing prior conviction 
and this to be admitted unless the court determines the ! 
probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs the pre- ! 
judicial affect to the defendant. 
I agree that these questions have not come up 
from the standpoint of attacking credibility of the defen-
dant, in that sense, since he hasn't taken the stand. But 
the inference is certainly very strong that if he was once 
convicted for the same charge for which he stands trial 
now, that that would have a tendency to reflect upon his 
propensity to again commit the same charge, whether there 
is a character trait that would tend to show that his action** 
in this case were in conformity with his prior actions. 
How do you get around that, Mr. Latimer? 
MR. LATIMER: Actually, I feel like I'm 
arguing to keep evidence in that came out on the defendant' , 
case. I'd be happy to strike that. I think it would be 
sufficient for the Court to instruct the Jury that that was 
an improper answer that they should disregard. They already 
know he's committed a felony. They are not to take into 
account what that felony was for. I think a cautionary 
instruction is sufficient. I don't think it's so prejudicial 
as to warrant a mistrial. 
THE COURT: I was wondering if Mr. Vigil 
was to attempt to take the stand, on a conviction for this 
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same type of -- is that admissible? 
MR. LATIMER; I think that it's a felony, 
that is only three years, I think is sufficient to go to his 
credibility. I don't think the probative value outweighs 
the prejudice. I think it's admissible under 604. I don't. 
But again, if the Court wants to instruct the Jury to dis-
regard Mr. Barton's answer, the state's happy with that. 
We don't care if it gets in or not, unless or until Mr. 
Vigil testifies. 
THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. 
Shumate? 
MR. SHUMATE: I'll submit it, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Counsel, I don't see how I 
can undo what I perceive to be the damage that has been done. 
I don't think a cautionary instruction is going to be effec-
tive to take out of the mind of what I perceive to be a 
something being brought to the attention of the jury that at 
this point and maybe at no other point in the trial ought to ! 
be before them. I recognize the inconvenience, the expense 
and all of the trouble it causes; but on the other hand, I 
think the defendant is entitled to a fair trial. 
I'm going to grant your motion for a mistrial 
in this case. 
MR. SHUMATE: Thank you, your Honor. 
I will prepare the appropriate pleadings and probably have 
8 
i<iBy.&«i , 
1 j them — 
2 THE COURTs toti are subject of being 
3 re-tried on this matter, Mr. Vigil. 
4 THE DEFENDANT: State it again? 
5 THE COURT: That doesn't mean that you 
6 are not subject to a re-trial on this matter. 
7 I am sensitive to the fact that I'm down here try-
8 ing to help out a situation to relieve the congestion of the 
9 calendar. But I don't think the condition of the calendar 
10 is something that ought to work to the disadvantage of one 
11 who is entitled to a fair trial. I don't see how we can 
12 get --
13 So, the motion is granted. 
14 MR. SHUMATE: Thank you, your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: Step down. 
16 (WHEREUPON, the witness stepped down from the 
17 witness stand.) 
18 THE COURT: And if you will bring the 
19 jury back in. 
20 (WHEREUPON, the Jury returned into the courtroom 
21 at 3:37 o'clock p.m.) 
22 - - -
23 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
24 I, EDWARD V. QUIST, hereby certify that 
25 I am an official court reporter, assigned to report for the 
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1 above-entitled Court, duly registered and licenced to 
2 practice in the State of Utah} that on the 25th%ay of 
3 September, 1989, I appeared before the above-named Court 
4 and reported the proceedings had and testimony given in the 
5 above-entitled cause of action; that the foregoing pages, 
6 numbered from 1 to 9, inclusive, contain a true and accurate 
7 transcript of an abstract from my stenographic notes, com-
8 prising the testimony of the witness J. Lower Barton recallca 
9 as a defense witness and law matters subsequent thereto, 
10 as taken in the above-entitled hearing, to the best of my 
11 ability. 
12 Dated at Provo, Utah this 11th day of 
13 October, 1989. 
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License No. 71 
18 I 310 County Courthouse 
51 Sou.th University 
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JAY LOWE BARTON 
CALLED AS A WITNESS BY AND ON BEHALF OF THE STATE, BEING 
FIRST DULY SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. LATIMER: 
Q PLEASE .STATE YOUR NAME. 
A JAY LOWE BARTON. 
Q YOUR OCCUPATION? 
A I'M A PROBATION AND PAROL AGENT FOR THE STATE OF 
UTAH. 
IN THAT POSITION, ARE YOU ACQUAINTED WITH BILLY 
VIGIL TODAY? 
A YES. 
Q AND YOU WERE HIS SUPERVISOR? 
A I WAS. 
Q I WANT TO DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO THE DATE OF JUNE 
21, 1989, ABOUT 5:50. WERE YOU ON DUTY AT THAT TIME? 
A I WAS. 
Q WHERE WERE YOU? 
A ON CEDAR CITY'S MAIN STREET, I BELIEVE. 
Q WHAT WERE YOU DOING? 
A I WAS WITH AGENT RON WODEHOUSE, SITTING RIGHT 
THERE. WE WERE CONDUCTING SOME OTHER AGENCY-RELATED 
BUSINESS OUT IN CEDAR CITY. 
Q " DID YOU HAVE OCCASION TO SEE MR. VIGIL AT THAT 
TIME? 
A YES. 
Q DESCRIBE FOR THE JURY WHAT YOU OBSERVED. 
A WE OBSERVED MR. VIGIL'S TRUCK PARKED IN FRONT OF 
THE CEDAR POST PAWN SHOP ON APPROXIMATELY 175 NORTH MAIN IN 
CEDAR CITY. MR. VIGIL AND A COUPLE OF OTHER INDIVIDUALS 
WERE STANDING AROUND THE TRUCK, AND THERE WAS TWO OR THREE 
COLORED TELEVISIONS IN THE BACK OF THE PICKUP. 
Q 
SAW? 
ALRIGHT. WHAT DID YOU DO IN RELATION TO WHAT YOU 
THE TELEVISIONS IN THE BACK OF THE PICKUP WERE 
WHAT ORIGINALLY CAUSED CONCERN, AND SO AFTER WE COMPLETED 
OUR BUSINESS WE WENT TO THE PAWN SHOP TO CHECK AND SEE WHAT 
MR. VIGIL HAD BEEN DOING. HE HAD LEFT BY THEN. 
Q OKAY. FROM WHAT YOU FOUND OUT, WAS HIS BUSINESS 
WITH THE TELEVISIONS LEGITIMATE? 
A YES, IT WAS. 
Q DID THE CLERK SAY ANYTHING — DID YOU SPEAK TO 
THE CLERK AT THE STORE? 
A YES. 
CONCERN? 
DID HE OR SHE SAY ANYTHING THAT WOULD CAUSE YOU 
YES. SHE ADVISED US MR. VIGIL HAD BEEN BUYING 
THE TELEVISIONS FROM THE MOTEL WHERE HE WAS EMPLOYED, THAT 
THEIR PURCHASE WAS LEGITIMATE. SHE THEN ADDED SHE WAS GLAD 
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THEY LEFT BECAUSE MR. VIGIL AND HIS ASSOCIATES WERE 
INTOXICATED. 
Q DID THAT ALSO CAUSE YOU CONCERN? 
A YES, IT DID. 
Q WHY? 
A HE HAS OR HE HAD A CLAUSE IN HIS PAROL AGREEMENT 
THAT PROHIBITED HIM FROM CONSUMING OR POSSESSING ALCOHOL. 
Q WHAT DID YOU OR AGENT WODEHOUSE DO? 
A AT THAT POINT WE DROVE TO MR. VIGIL'S APARTMENT. 
HE AND HIS ROOMMATE WERE THERE, AND WE ASKED MR. VIGIL IF HE 
HAD BEEN CONSUMING ALCOHOL, THAT WE HAD HAD SOME REPORTS 
THAT HE HAD, AND EXPLAINED TO HIM WHERE WE RECEIVED THE 
INFORMATION. 
Q WHAT DID HE SAY? 
AT FIRST HE SAID HE HADN'T. HE LATER INDICATED 
THAT HE HAD. 
Q WHAT DID HE INDICATE SPECIFICALLY? 
THAT HE HAD HAD A COUPLE OF DRINKS. 
Q WHAT DID YOU DO IN RESPONSE TO HIS ADMISSION TO 
HAVING HAD ALCOHOL? 
A ASKED HIM TO SUBMIT TO A FIELD INTOXILIZER TEST. 
WE HAVE A SMALL, PORTABLE INTOXILIZER. 
Q DID THAT INDICATE POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL? 
A YES," IT DID. ' 
Q THEN WHAT DID YOU DO? 
A MR. VIGIL WAS TAKEN INTO CUSTODY AT THAT TIME, 
WHICH IS STANDARD PROCEDURE. 
WE CHECKED THE APARTMENT TO SEE — WE WERE MAINLY 
LOOKING FOR ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AT THE TIME. 
Q AND DESCRIBE FOR THE JURY WHAT ITEMS YOU HAD 
OCCASION TO LOOK THROUGH. 
A WE LOOKED THROUGH — WE CHECKED THE REFRIGERATOR 
IN THE KITCHEN, MR. VIGIL'S BEDROOM AREA, HIS PERSONAL 
BELONGINGS. 
Q DID YOU LOOK THROUGH A DUFFLE BAG? 
A WE DID. 
Q WAS THAT DUFFLE BAG IDENTIFIED TO YOU AS MR. 
VIGIL'S? 
A YES, IT WAS. 
Q WHO MADE THAT IDENTIFICATION? 
A MR. VIGIL'S ROOMMATE. MR. VIGIL WAS AT THAT 
POINT IN CUSTODY IN THE VEHICLE. 
Q ALRIGHT. DID YOU FIND ANYTHING OF INTEREST IN 
THAT DUFFLE BAG? 
A YES, WE DID. 
Q DESCRIBE GENERALLY WHAT YOU FOUND. 
A MAY I REFER TO MY NOTES? 
Q IF THAT WILL HELP TO REFRESH YOUR RECOLLECTION, 
PLEASE DO. 
A WE FOUND A COUPLE OF LARGE KNIVES AND ALSO A PAIR 
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OF NUN-CHUCKS AND A THROWING STAR, WHICH IS A MARSHAL ARTS 
WEAPON. 
Q LET ME, IF I MAY, SHOW YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED 
PREVIOUSLY ~ WHAT'S IDENTIFIED AS STATE'S EXHIBIT 1. DO 
YOU RECOGNIZE THAT ITEM? 
A YES, I -DO. THAT'S ONE OF THE LARGE KNIVES THAT 
WAS IN THE DUFFLE BAG. 
Q HOW ABOUT STATE'S EXHIBIT 2, DO YOU RECOGNIZE 
THAT ITEM? 
A YES. THAT'S A BOOT KNIFE ALSO IN THE DUFFLE BAG. 
Q I ALSO SHOW YOU STATE'S EXHIBIT 3. DO YOU 
RECOGNIZE THAT ITEM? 
A YES. THOSE ARE THE NUN-CHUCKS IN THE DUFFLE BAG. 
Q STATE'S EXHIBIT 4, DO YOU RECOGNIZE THAT ITEM? 
A YES. IT'S A THROWING STAR. IT'S A MARSHAL ARTS 
WEAPON THAT WAS ALSO LOCATED IN THE DUFFLE BAG. 
Q DID YOU HAVE OCCASION TO LOOK IN THE TOOL BOX 
BELONGING TO MR. VIGIL? 
A YES, WE DID. 
Q WHAT DID YOU FIND THERE OF INTEREST? 
A A FISH FILET KNIFE IN THE TOOL BOX LOCATED IN THE 
BED OF HIS PICKUP. 
Q LET ME SHOW YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED STATE'S 
EXHIBIT 6. DO YOU RECOGNIZE THAT? 
A "YES. THAT'S THE FILET KNIFE THAT WAS LOCATED 
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THERE. 
YOU SAY THE TOOL BOX WAS IN MR. VIGIL'S PICKUP? 
YES. 
DID YOU FIND ANYTHING ELSE IN THE PICKUP? 
THERE WAS A KNIFE THAT WAS LOCATED UNDER THE 
DRIVER'S SIDE SEAT. 
LET ME SHOW YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED STATE'S 
EXHIBIT 5. DO YOU RECOGNIZE THAT ITEM? 
YES. THAT'S A KNIFE THAT WAS UNDER THE SEAT OF 
THE PICKUP. 
Q ALRIGHT. DID YOU HAVE OCCASION TO LOOK IN ANY OF 
MR. VIGIL'S CLOTHING? 
A WE WENT THROUGH SOME OF HIS CLOTHES LOOKING FOR 
WEAPONS AND ALCOHOL AT THAT POINT. 
Q OKAY. DID YOU FIND ANYTHING IN HIS CLOTHING THAT 
DREW YOUR ATTENTION? 
A YES, WE DID. I BELIEVE IT WAS AGENT WODEHOUSE 
THAT FOUND THAT ITEM, THOUGH. 
MR. LATIMER: YOUR HONOR, AT THIS TIME I WOULD 
MAKE A MOTION FOR THE ADMISSION OF STATE'S EXHIBITS 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5 AND 6. 
MR. SHUMATE: YOUR HONOR, MAY COUNSEL APPROACH 
THE BENCH OFF THE RECORD? 
THE COURT: YOU MAY. 
(WHEREUPON AN OFF-THE-RECORD DISCUSSION WAS 
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